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Abstract.  We discuss empirical challenges in multicountry studies of the effect of firm-level 
corporate governance on firm value, focusing on emerging markets.  We assess the severe data, 
“construct validity,” and endogeneity issues in these studies, propose methods to respond to those 
issues, and apply those methods to a study of five major emerging markets -- Brazil, India, Korea, 
Russia, and Turkey.  We develop unique time-series datasets on governance in each country.  We 
address construct validity by building country-specific indices which reflect local norms and 
institutions.  These similar-but-not-identical indices predict firm market value in each country, and 
when pooled across countries in firm fixed-effects (FE) and random-effects (RE) regressions.  In 
contrast, a “common index” that uses the same elements in each country, has no predictive power in 
FE regressions.  For the country-specific and pooled indices, FE and RE coefficients on governance 
are generally lower than in pooled OLS regressions; and coefficients with extensive covariates are 
generally lower than with limited covariates.  These results confirm the value of using FE or RE 
with extensive covariates to reduce omitted variable bias.  We develop lower bounds on our 
estimates which reflect potential omitted variable bias. 
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1. Introduction 
Studies of whether firm-level corporate governance affects firm market value face three core, 
related obstacles to identification.  These can be broadly classified as “construct validity” (a term we 
borrow from education and psychology, see Shadish, Cook and Campbell, 2002); limited data; and 
endogeneity.  Data and construct validity concerns are especially severe in multicountry studies and in 
emerging markets, which are the focus of this study. 
Construct validity is central in corporate governance research, yet rarely addressed.  A 
governance index is a construct that imperfectly measures unobserved underlying governance.  There is 
no direct way to quantify the gap between the construct and the underlying concept.  Moreover, what 
matters in corporate governance often depends on local norms and institutions, which vary widely across 
countries.  Thus, particular elements of a governance index may fit underlying governance well in some 
countries but poorly in others. 
A second core problem is lack of data on governance.  Time-series data is scarce.  Often, data on 
particular governance elements is available in some countries but not in others.  As we show, it is 
impossible to use public data to build a broad governance index based on common elements (a “common 
index”), even across the five countries we study.  It is nearly impossible to do so even if one can rely on 
nonpublic data from surveys of firms, as we do in Brazil, India, and Korea.  The best common index we 
can build has weak predictive power, perhaps because it is a poor measure of underlying governance.   
The third core problem is endogeneity, which comes in several forms.  Omitted variable bias is of 
particular concern.  In individual countries, one can sometimes find natural experiments that provide 
identification for particular aspects of governance.  In a multicountry study, this research design is not 
feasible.  The next best approach, and the one we pursue here, is to build panel data and use firm fixed (or 
at least random) effects, plus extensive covariates, to limit omitted variable bias. 
Most prior research on the relationship between corporate governance and market value in 
emerging markets suffers from these problems.  The literature contains two principal strategies: single 
country studies (“deep and narrow”) and “massively multicountry” studies that pool firms across many 
countries (“broad and shallow”).  Single country studies suffer from limited sample sizes and lack of 
generalizability.  Massively multicountry studies can provide reasonable sample sizes and are potentially 
generalizable, but to date, have failed to address these core obstacles to credible inference.1 
We propose methods to respond to these challenges and then apply the methods to a study of five 
major emerging markets:  Brazil, India, Korea, Russia, and Turkey (“BRIKT” countries).2  Together, 
these countries provide a representative sample of moderately developed emerging markets.  They differ 
in many ways, including legal traditions, language, culture, geographic location, and background legal 
rules. 
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We address data limitations by compiling, largely by hand, time-series data on governance in 
each country.  Our data covers many though not all public firms in each country.  Our overall dataset is, 
we believe, close to the best that researchers can currently build across multiple emerging markets.  
We address construct validity by building country-specific corporate governance indices 
(“country CGI”) which reflect local norms and institutions.  Each is comprised (data permitting) of 
“subindices” for board structure, board procedure, disclosure, ownership structure, minority shareholder 
rights, and control of related party transactions.  Each subindex is comprised of one or more governance 
“elements” that seek to capture specific aspects of governance that we consider relevant in each country.  
The subindices for each country are broadly similar, but the individual elements vary across countries, 
and reflect the norms, institutions, and data limitations in each country.  In contrast, prior multicountry 
studies rely on a “common index,” comprised of the same elements in each country. 
As an example of the limitations of a common index, consider an audit committee.  These 
committees are often thought to be valuable.  But we cannot measure their value in India or Turkey, 
where they are required, nor in Russia, where board committees are formally not permitted.  We can learn 
little in Brazil, where many firms employ the substitute Brazilian institution of the “fiscal board.”  Our 
approach involves building a Brazil-specific board structure subindex that takes both institutions into 
account. 
Having built country-specific indices, we assess whether governance predicts firm market value 
(proxied by Tobin’s q) in each country, in firm fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) specifications.  
We find positive coefficients on country CGI in all five countries.  This approach – conducting a 
multicountry study using similar-but-not-identical country indices – can be seen as a “middle way” 
between single-country studies, from which it is hard to generalize; and massively multicountry studies.3  
The RE coefficients are statistically significant in all five countries; the FE coefficients are significant 
except in Brazil.  With FE, one-standard-deviation increase in country CGI predicts an economically 
meaningful, increase in ln(Tobin’s q), ranging from .045 (Korea) to .089 (Brazil).   
We then pool the indices for Brazil, India, Korea, and Turkey (we cannot use Russia when 
pooling), run multicountry FE and RE regressions, and find strong evidence that the resulting pooled 
governance index (“Pooled CGI”) predicts Tobin’s q.  A one standard deviation increase in Pooled CGI 
predicts a .06-.07 increase in ln(Tobin’s q).  We also build a “Common Index” from the 15 elements that 
are available in all four countries and useful in at least two of them (we require elements to be useful in at 
least two countries because we seek to assess whether a common index can explain the relationship 
between governance and Tobin’s q across countries).  This index has weak predictive power with RE and 
none with FE.  In regressions which include both the Common Index and a “non-common” index built 
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from the remaining elements, power to predict Tobin’s q comes entirely from the country-specific 
elements included in the non-common index. 
Omitted variable bias is important.  In both individual country and pooled regressions, 
coefficients on CGI are generally higher in weaker designs (pooled OLS versus RE; RE versus FE).  
Coefficients are also generally higher with fewer covariates.  This suggests the need for research designs 
with FE (or at a minimum RE), plus extensive covariates.  In multicountry studies that use regressions on 
pooled data across countries, it is also valuable to interact the covariates with country dummies, thus 
allowing for country-specific “response surfaces.” 
In any context in which omitted variable bias is likely to be important, it can be important to 
assess the sensitivity of estimates to potential omitted variables.  We assess sensitivity using two sets of 
bounds, adapted respectively from Hosman, Hansen, and Holland (2010) and Altonji, Elder and Taber 
(2005).  These bounds use the sensitivity of coefficient estimates to included covariates to estimate lower 
bounds on those coefficients under assumptions about bias from omitted covariates.  The lower bounds 
for country CGI are positive in all five countries and statistically significant in Korea and Russia, as well 
as for Pooled CGI. 
We study here only firm-level governance in emerging markets.  But the concerns we raise with 
common indices also apply to multicountry indices in developed markets such as the ISS index (e.g., 
Aggarwal et al., 2009), to the LLSV indices of anti-director rights and creditor rights (La Porta et al., 
1997, 1998), and to measures of economic competitiveness (e.g., World Bank, 2013).  In all these areas, 
we face a choice between a common index, whose elements may poorly capture the underlying concept in 
some or many countries, and richer, country-specific measures with uncertain generalizability.  There too:  
(i) country-specific indices, which seek to measure a common underlying concept in ways adapted to each 
country’s circumstances, may outperform a common index; and (ii) a common index is subject to omitted 
variable bias, because the common index is likely correlated with omitted country-specific aspects of 
governance. 
This paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 describes our country-level governance indices. 
Section 3 develops our methodology.  Section 4 presents results for individual countries.  Section 5 
presents pooled cross-country results.  Section 6 contains sensitivity analyses.  Section 7 concludes.  We 
skip a literature review, and refer readers to the recent review by Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013); see also 
Black, de Carvalho and Gorga (2012); Brown, Beekes and Verhoeven (2011).  We focus here on results 
for overall country and pooled indices; we study which subindices predict firm market value in a separate 
project (Black et al., 2013b).   
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2.  Samples, Governance Surveys, and Indices 
To build country governance indices, we rely on nonpublic data from firm surveys that we 
conduct in Brazil (2004, 2006, 2009) and India (2006, 2007, 2012), nonpublic data from surveys 
conducted by the Korea Corporate Governance Service in Korea (1998-2004), public data (from firm 
annual reports) in Turkey (2006-2011), and a mix of public and nonpublic data in Russia (1999-2005).  
This data collection effort greatly improves data quality compared to public data or commercial surveys, 
but also limits sample size and available years.4 
We build country indices as follows.  We first identify specific governance “elements.”  We 
include an element in a country index if:  (i) it is often believed to correspond to good governance 
(sometimes with empirical support, but more often not); (ii) it is relevant to governance in the judgment 
of the “local” coauthor in each country; (iii) we have reasonably complete data across firms; (iv) there is 
reasonable variation across firms; and (v) the element is not too similar to another element.  Below, we 
use Brazil as an example to illustrate our approach.  An expanded working paper provides information on 
data sources and indices for all five countries (Black et al., 2013a).   
2.1.  Brazil CGI as Illustrative Example 
Brazil CGI (BCGI) is based on a survey distributed in 2004, 2006, and 2009 to all public firms 
(for details, see Black, de Carvalho and Gorga, 2010).  We exclude banks, government-controlled firms, 
and subsidiaries of foreign firms.  We are able to build BCGI and measure Tobin’s q and covariates for 
170 firms, but only 72 firms answered two or more surveys.  BCGI consists of six equally weighted 
subindices for Board Structure, Board Procedure, Disclosure, Ownership Structure, Shareholder Rights, 
and Related-Party Transactions (RPTs).  The six subindices, in turn, reflect 41 elements.  Most elements 
are dichotomous ("1" if a firm has the attribute, "0" otherwise); we normalize continuous variables to run 
from 0~1.  Table 1 lists the elements of two key subindices – board structure and disclosure.  The 
expanded working paper covers other subindices and provides details on our choice of elements.   
Brazil Board Structure Subindex (7 elements).  This subindex focuses on board independence and 
other aspects of board structure.  Board independence is often seen as a core element of corporate 
governance (e.g., OECD, 2004; Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell, 2008).  An audit committee can help to 
ensure financial reporting integrity (e.g., Klein, 2002).  In Brazil, the fiscal board often substitutes for the 
audit committee, so our governance index considers this institution as well.  Only two of the seven 
elements are available from public data. 
Brazil Disclosure Subindex (11 elements).  This subindex focuses on financial disclosure, which 
is associated with higher Tobin’s q (e.g., Durnev and Kim, 2005).  We identify 11 disclosure elements, 
including whether the firm:  prepares financial statements that meet international accounting standards; 
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prepares English language financial statements; provides specific financial disclosures, such as a 
statement of cash flows, that are common in other countries; posts financial statements on a company 
website; and discloses major shareholders and related party transactions (RPTs). 
Computing BCGI and Subindices.  Within each subindex, we weight each element equally, then 
reweight so each subindex runs from 0~100.  BCGI is an average of the subindex scores.  BCGI values 
range from 19.1 to 91.5 (mean = 62.1).  Table 2 provides summary statistics for our governance indices.  
For regressions, we rescale BCGI as follows:  we scale each subindex to mean 0, σ = 1, sum the scaled 
subindices, and rescale the sum to mean 0, σ = 1.  Rescaling makes the coefficients on country CGI 
reasonably comparable across countries. 
India, Korea, and Turkey.  Our approach to building country CGI is similar for India, Korea, and 
Turkey.  For each element in these four countries, Table 1 indicates in which countries the element is used, 
and whether data on that element is available or “feasible” (available but only with substantial additional 
effort).  
Russia.  Russia is different and illustrates the challenges in building a multicountry governance 
index.  We lack the data to build our own index, and rely instead on six indices developed by different 
sources (for details, see Black, Love, and Rachinsky, 2006).  We omit Russia from Table 1 due to limited 
overlap between the governance elements available there and those available in the other countries.  The 
Russian indices do not let us build subindices that are comparable to the other four countries, so we 
cannot include Russia in Pooled CGI. 
Comparison to Developed Markets.  Our country indices are very different from an index 
appropriate for a developed market.  For example, the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) “GIM” index 
focuses on takeover defenses, which are irrelevant for firms with a controlling shareholder or group, as is 
the case for most of the firms our sample.  BCGI shares only 3 common elements (classified board of 
directors, dual-class common stock, and take-out rights) with the 24-element GIM index, and only four 
elements with the 44-element Institutional Shareholder Services index (see Aggarwal et al., 2009).  
2.2.  Commonalities and Differences across Countries 
We seek to maintain common subindices and elements where feasible, but adapt our indices to 
each country.  For example, 18 of the 41 Brazil elements are unique to Brazil.  The full version of Table 1, 
which lists all elements in each country, is highly complex.  Further complexity is buried in dozens of 
decisions on how elements should be defined and coded.  In that complexity lies a central message of this 
article.  We sought to build indices that cover similar aspects of governance in each country.  At the 
subindex, we hope that we more-or-less succeeded.  Individual elements, however, differ greatly across 
 6
countries.  Of the 121 elements used in one of (Brazil, India, Korea, and Turkey), only 33 are used in two 
or more countries; eight in three countries, and none in all four of these countries. 
Suppose that we were to build a “Public Index”, using elements that are publicly available in all 
five countries.  That index would have only three elements:  one board structure element (audit committee 
exists) and two disclosure elements (firm has English language financials; financial statements include 
statement of cash flows).  Moreover, only some of these elements would be relevant in particular 
countries.  In India, audit committees are required; all financials are in English, and must include a 
statement of cash flows.  This leaves no useful public elements at all.   
One can improve on the Public Index by using the nonpublic data from our surveys, at the cost of 
building an index that does not cover all public firms and cannot be easily replicated.  We use this data to 
build a “Common Index” consisting of elements which are available in Brazil, India, Korea, and Turkey, 
and are useful in at least two of these countries  This index includes 15 elements:  5 in board structure, 4 
in disclosure, 2 each in board procedure and ownership; and one each for shareholder rights and RPTs.  
Of the 15 elements, 12 are useful in three countries, but none are useful in all four.  We show below that 
the Common Index has little predictive value.  
3.  Methodology:  Construct Validity and Endogeneity Concerns 
3.1.  Embracing Construct Validity 
Prior multicountry studies have used the same governance index across countries.  Given the 
severe constraints on our ability to build a meaningful common index, we adopt a different approach.  We 
posit that there is an underlying, unobserved concept of “overall corporate governance”, which can 
usefully be divided into unobserved “buckets” of board structure, board procedure, disclosure, ownership, 
shareholder rights, and RPT control; and that each bucket is composed of unobserved “aspects” of 
governance, such as true effectiveness of the board of directors; the audit committee (or a local substitute), 
and so on.  Measuring corporate governance then involves developing measurable constructs – at the 
element, subindex, and overall index levels – that map decently onto unobserved true governance.  That is, 
we are measuring constructs (elements) within larger constructs (subindices) within a still larger construct 
(overall country index).  The mapping from constructs to underlying governance will depend on data 
availability and on local rules and institutions.  Both the observed and unobserved aspects of governance 
will differ across countries; thus, the elements and subindices we construct to capture them must vary as 
well. 
Also, we are interested in assessing whether a within-country change in governance predicts a 
change in Tobin’s q, or another outcome variable, in a panel data setting.  Governance levels vary greatly 
across countries, reflecting a mix of local rules and practices.  Only elements with meaningful variation, 
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both across firms and across time within firms, are useful for that purpose.  Those elements will also vary 
substantially across countries. 
How will we know whether we have chosen sensible constructs – whether, say, the Brazil CGI 
and Turkey CGI constructs measure similar things?  A null result could mean either that governance does 
not affect Tobin’s q or that we have a poor construct.  A result in some countries (but not others) could 
mean that governance only matters in those countries or that we have better constructs in those countries.  
But if we find a positive association across countries, with a reasonably strong research design (say firm 
fixed effects with extensive covariates), this provides evidence both that governance predicts Tobin’s q 
and that our country-specific constructs do a decent job of measuring governance. 
3.2.  Model Specifications 
Our principal outcome variable is Tobin’s q, which is a common outcome in “governance-to-
value” studies such as ours.  To reduce the influence of high-q outliers, we take logs and then exclude 
outliers, for which studentized residual from regressing ln(q) on country CGI (year-by-year) > |1.96|.  To 
limit reverse causation, in which changes in Tobin’s q lead to changes in governance, we measure 
governance in the first part of a year and Tobin’s q at year-end. 
Prior multicountry studies use cross-sectional data.  We seek to improve on this specification by 
using panel data.  We run RE and FE regressions in each country using an unbalanced panel, with 
standard errors clustered on firm.  These are well-known models, we review here aspects that are relevant 
for our study.  A general firm effects model is: 
, 0 1 , 2 , ,ln( ) *(country ) *i t i t i t t i i tq CGI g fβ β ε= + + + + +β x   (1) 
Here xi,t is a vector of covariates, which we assume to be exogenous, gt are year dummies and fi 
are firm effects.  Exogeneity requires, among other things that current country CGI does not influence 
future x’s.  This is unlikely to be strictly true, but may be a reasonable approximation.  First, prior studies 
find that firm characteristics only weakly predict CGI. 5   Bhargava and Sargan (1983) suggest that 
assuming exogeneity is more reasonable if one uses RE or FE to address unobserved time-invariant 
heterogeneity, has a “short” time dimension, and a time-persistent variable of interest. 
The FE model can be seen as a “time-demeaned” specification.  Let 
, ,
( )
i t
dm
i t i= −x x x , and similar 
for other variables.  The FE model is: 
 
, ,, 1 , 2
ln( ) * *
i t i t
dm dm dm dm dm
i t i t tq CGI gβ ε= + + +β x   (2) 
The FE estimator is unbiased even if the firm effects are correlated with country CGI.  However, FE 
requires at least two observations of each firm; this imposes a substantial loss of sample size in Brazil 
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(only 72 of 159 firms appear twice) and India (186 of 399 appear twice).  We indicate this below by  
reporting FE sample size excluding firms that appear only once.  FE estimates also rely only on within-
firm variation.  This reduces power and prevents one from studying aspects of governance with little time 
variation, notably ownership structure. 
The RE model makes a “strict exogeneity” assumption; one form of this assumption is that the 
firm effects are uncorrelated with the covariates in all time periods: Cov(fi, xi,t) = 0 ∀ t.  RE leads to a 
“quasi-demeaned” feasible GLS estimate.  Let σε and σf be the standard deviations of εi,t and fi, T be the 
number of periods, and define: 
 
2 2
1
* fT
ε
ε
σλ
σ σ
= −
+
  
and quasi-demeaned variables 
, ,
( * )
i t
qdm
i t iλ= −x x x  and similar for other variables.  The RE model is: 
 
, ,, 1 , 2
ln( ) *(country ) *
i t i t
qdm qdm qdm qdm qdm qdm
i t i t t iq CGI g fβ ε= + + + +β x   (3) 
Strict exogeneity is unlikely to be satisfied in governance studies.  However, RE has greater 
power, due to larger effective sample size and ability to exploit both within-firm and across-firm variation.  
Also, the RE estimator converges to the FE estimator as λ approaches 1.  One may hope that the bias of 
RE estimates, relative to FE, will be limited if λ is close to 1.   
We see both RE and FE as useful specifications, with different strengths.  For stronger 
identification, one would need a “quasi-experimental” design with an exogenous shock to governance.  
This design is not realistically available for a multicountry study.6  With a longer, balanced panel, it could 
be valuable to use a dynamic auto-regressive RE model, following Bhargava and Sargan (1983) and 
Bhargava (2010).  For a time-persistent variable such as governance, Bhargava’s (2010) results for 
dividends suggest that a static model may understate long-term impact. 
3.3.  Covariates and Omitted Variable Bias 
FE and RE will be biased if unobserved time-varying covariates ui,t are correlated with both 
country CGI and Tobin’s q (e.g., Wintoki, Linck, and Netter, 2012).  We use extensive covariates to 
reduce omitted variable bias.  We use the following covariates, summarized in Table 2, the expanded 
working paper provides details.  Firm size:  ln(assets) to control for the effect of firm size on Tobin’s q; 
Firm age:  ln(years listed +1), because younger firms are likely to be faster-growing and more intangible 
asset-intensive, which can lead to higher Tobin’s q; Leverage:  total liabilities/total assets, because 
leverage can influence Tobin’s q by affecting income tax and reducing free cash flow problems, and is 
mechanically related to Tobin’s q.  Growth prospects and profitability, which directly predict Tobin’s q.  
We control for geometric sales growth over the last 3 years, and for profitability using both net 
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income/assets and EBIT/sales.  Capital intensity and asset tangibility:  Asset tangibility can both predict 
Tobin’s q and affect what type of governance a firm needs.  We control for PPE/sales, capex/PPE, 
R&D/sales, and advertising/sales.  Liquidity:  annual share turnover (traded shares/total shares) and free 
float, since share prices may be higher for firms with more liquid shares.  Ownership:  fractional 
ownership by the largest shareholder, foreign investors, and the state.  Product market competition, which 
can directly affect value and substitute for governance in imposing discipline on managers:  exports/sales 
and domestic market share in the firm’s principal industry.  With RE, we also use several firm-level 
variables which can predict both governance and q:  Industry dummies, defined separately in each country 
(9 dummies for Brazil, 11 for India, 4-digit Korean SIC codes for Korea, and 2-digit US-equivalent SIC 
codes for Turkey.  US cross-listing dummy and MSCI index dummy to proxy for liquidity and foreign 
investor interest.  Business group dummy, because group firms may behave differently than stand-alone 
firms. 
4.  Country-Level Results 
4.1.  RE and FE Results 
In Table 3, we examine whether country CGI predicts Tobin’s q, using RE and FE specifications.  
With RE, country CGI is a statistically significant predictor of higher Tobin’s q, in each country.  With 
FE, the coefficients on country CGI drop in all countries except India, but remain positive in all countries 
and statistically significant in all countries but Brazil.  The FE coefficients are economically important 
and have plausible magnitudes -- they range from 0.045 (Korea) to 0.089 (Brazil).  Since country CGI is 
scaled to σ=1 and the dependent variable is in logs, these coefficients imply that a one-standard-deviation 
increase in country CGI predicts from 4.6 to 9.3% higher Tobin’s q. 
A Breusch-Pagan test strongly rejects the absence of firm effects, and implies that pooled OLS 
results will be biased.  We also report tests for equivalence of FE and RE coefficients, using both the 
well-known Hausman test and the correlated random effects (CRE) model, which has advantages over the 
Hausman test (Wooldridge, 2013, § 14.3).7  These tests reject the equivalence of RE and FE models for 
all coefficients together.  For country CGI by itself, the CRE test rejects model equivalence only for 
Russia.  Both tests assume exogenous x’s.  Median λ, indicating whether RE results are closer to pooled 
OLS (λ = 0) or to FE (λ = 1), is only 0.30 in India and 0.33 in Brazil, but is above 0.60 in Korea, Russia, 
and Turkey, which suggests that RE is a reasonable specification in these countries. 
Prior multicountry studies rely on cross-sectional OLS regressions.  To assess the reliability of an 
OLS specification, we also conduct unreported pooled OLS regressions.  We find large differences 
between pooled OLS results and the FE results in Table 3.  The ratio of pooled OLS/FE coefficients on 
country CGI ranges from 0.49 (India) to 2.21 (Russia).  FE coefficients tend to be lower (mean = 0.066) 
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than pooled OLS (mean = 0.083); suggesting that pooled OLS estimates are likely to be upward biased.  
RE coefficients are usually intermediate between pooled OLS and FE (mean = .077).  Intermediate RE 
coefficients, especially if λ values are not far from 1, suggest that RE is likely to be less biased than 
pooled OLS. 
4.2.  Sensitivity of Results: Covariates, Outliers, and Clustering 
In unreported results, we vary the FE specification in Table 3 to assess how choice of 
specification affects our results.  First, we use a limited set of covariates, similar to those used by Durnev 
and Kim (2005) (below, “DK covariates”):  ln(assets; R&D/sales (not available in Brazil); exports/sales 
(not available in Brazil); industry dummies; cross-listing dummy; and year dummies.  Other multicountry 
studies also use very limited covariates.  Coefficients and t-statistics rise in all countries, strongly so in 
Brazil and Turkey.  The Brazil coefficient nearly doubles from 0.088 to 0.162 and goes from insignificant 
(t = 1.15) to strongly significant (t = 3.79).  The Turkey coefficient rises from 0.055 (t = 2.06) to 0.077 (t 
= 2.70).  The tendency to find higher coefficients if we use more limited covariates increases as we move 
from FE to RE to pooled OLS.  This suggests that results from prior multicountry studies likely have 
substantial upward bias. 
In Table 3, we use ln(q) as our dependent variable and exclude outliers.  If we include outliers, 
the FE coefficient in India drops from .075 (t = 2.27) to a negligible .003.  In Brazil, the coefficient drops 
from .088 to .052 (insignificant in both cases); in Turkey, the coefficient rises from .055 to .068.  If we 
use q in levels as the dependent variable and exclude outliers (as in Durnev and Kim, 2005, and Klapper 
and Love, 2004), the coefficient on country CGI is significant only in Korea.  Thus, how one defines the 
dependent variable and handles outliers can have a major impact on results. 
It is common in corporate finance research with panel data to cluster standard errors on firm, as 
we do (e.g., Petersen, 2009).  However, errors could also be correlated within industry.  With a large 
sample, one might simply cluster on industry instead of firm.  For our study, the best clustering level is 
unclear, because the number of industry clusters is limited, ranging from 16 in Russia to 48 in Korea.  A 
rule of thumb is that clustering can become unreliable if the number of clusters drops much below 50.  
We nonetheless use industry clusters as a robustness check.  In Table 3, we report t-statistics for country 
CGI, and the number of clusters, in separate rows, just underneath the t-statistics with firm clusters.  With 
FE, t-statistics barely change in Brazil, Turkey, and Russia, and rise in Korea, but India CGI becomes 
only marginally significant.  RE standard errors are somewhat more sensitive to clustering level, but the 
RE coefficients remains significant except in India, where they become marginally significant.  Thus, 
varying the clustering level can be a useful robustness check on standard errors. 
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5.  Pooled Regressions across Countries 
5.1.  Results for Pooled CGI 
We next pool observations across Brazil, India, Korea, and Turkey, treat the country CGI indices 
as if they capture the same underlying construct, and combine them into “Pooled CGI.”  Russia CGI is too 
dissimilar from other country indices to permit pooling.  We are agnostic on the value added by pooling, 
but note that: (i) pooling can help to make sense of results in a many-country study; and (ii) we need to 
pool our results to compare them to other multicounty studies. 
We report results for Pooled CGI in Table 4.  We modify the regression specifications for Table 3 
as follows.  We use only covariates available in all four countries (we lose foreign ownership, 
advertising/sales, R&D/sales, exports/sales, and market share; with RE we also lose MSCI dummy).  We 
convert country-specific industry dummies to 2-digit US-equivalent SIC codes.  We interact the year and 
industry dummies and covariates with country dummies; this lets their impact vary across countries 
(country dummies will be absorbed by the year * country interactions).  In effect, this allows a separate 
response surface for each country.  For FE, we weight results from each country by 1/(number of firms), 
to give roughly equal weight to each country.  Weights are not available for RE.  Letting c index countries, 
dc be country dummies, and suppressing the FE weights, the regression specification is: 
, , 0 1 , , 2 , , , ,ln *(Pooled ) * * ( * )c i t c i t c i t c i t c c i tQ CGI d f g dβ β ε= + + + + +β X   (4) 
In Table 4, consider first rows (1) (RE) and (2) (FE).  In column (1), Pooled CGI is strongly 
significant in both specifications, with similar coefficients.   This is expected given the single country 
results, and suggests that our country indices are capturing something about governance that affects firm 
market value.  This might justify combining country indices that are similar at the subindex level, but 
different at the element level.  In unreported results, we interact Pooled CGI with country dummies 
(omitting Korea) to check whether the coefficients on country CGI differ significantly across countries.  
The CGI*country dummy interaction terms are insignificant.  An F-test (for FE) or χ2 test (for RE) for 
joint significance also fails to reject the null of equal coefficients. 
5.2.  Common and Non-Common CGI Indices 
We next use the 15 common elements (data available in all four countries, judged useful in at 
least two countries), to build country-level indices using common elements and pool these country-level 
indices to build the Common Index, following the same procedures as for country CGI and pooled CGI.  
In unreported regressions, the FE coefficients on country common indices are small and insignificant; the 
RE coefficient is significant only for Korea. 
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Table 4, column (2) provides results for Common Index.  This index takes a positive coefficient 
with RE which is statistically significant, but economically modest at 0.015 (versus 0.067 for Pooled 
CGI).  If we drop Korea, the coefficient becomes small and insignificant (coeff. = 0.006, t = 0.33).  With 
FE, the coefficient on Common Index is small and insignificant (coeff. = 0.005; t = 0.32).  Thus, the best 
common index we can build has little power to predict firm market value.   
We next assess the relative power of the common and non-common governance elements to 
predict Tobin’s q.  We use two approaches.  First, we build “Non-Common” country indices, composed 
of the non-common elements of the country CGIs, and then build Pooled Non-common CGI, based on 
these country-level indices.  In column (3), we include Common Index and Pooled Non-Common CGI in 
the same regression, otherwise similar to eqn. (4).  Pooled Non-Common CGI is statistically and 
economically strong across specifications.  In contrast, the coefficient on Common Index is insignificant 
and close to zero in both RE and FE.  In effect, Common Index has no predictive power, separate from 
Non-common CGI.  Its modest power in column (2) instead reflects omitted variable bias, due to the 0.36 
correlation between Common Index and Pooled Non-common CGI.   
In column (4), we assess the relative power of common and country-specific governance elements 
in a different manner.  We include Common Index and Pooled CGI in the same regression.  The 
coefficient on Common Index provides an estimate of the power of the part of Common Index that is 
orthogonal to Pooled CGI to predict Tobin’s q, and similar for Pooled CGI.  Pooled CGI remains 
economically and statistically strong, with coefficients similar to column 1, where it was included alone.  
In contrast, the coefficients on Common Index are negative in both RE and FE, and the RE coefficient is 
marginally significant.  Taken together, the results in columns (3) and (4) provide strong evidence that 
what matters in corporate governance is captured principally by the non-common, country-specific 
elements, rather than the common ones. 
As a robustness check, we report t-statistics clustered at the industry*country level instead of the 
firm level, to allow for correlated errors across firms in the same industry and country.  Focusing on FE, 
standard errors for Pooled CGI increase moderately in regression (1), but barely change in regression (4).  
In regression (1), the t-statistic for Pooled CGI remains strong at 3.17. 
5.3.  Sensitivity to Choice of Covariates 
We noted above that country CGI results tend to strengthen if we use weaker covariates.  We find 
a similar pattern for Pooled CGI – stronger covariates generally produce smaller coefficients.  We provide 
an example in Table 4, row (3).  Instead of interacting year dummies and covariates with country 
dummies, we include them in non-interacted form, following eqn. (2).  This specification is closer to that 
used in prior studies.  It assumes a single response surface for covariates across countries; in contrast, eqn. 
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(4) allows country-specific surfaces.  The coefficient on pooled CGI with FE rises from 0.63 to 0.83, 
suggesting the importance of allowing country-specific responses to covariates.  In unreported results, the 
upward bias from using a common response surface rises as we change the specification from FE to RE to 
pooled OLS.   
In unreported results, if we further limit the set of covariates, Common Index becomes positive 
and statistically significant with both RE and FE.  For example, if we use FE, a single response surface, 
and the limited set of DK covariates, Common Index becomes positive and significant (coeff. = 0.023, t = 
2.71). Common Index remains marginally significant (coeff. = .016, t = 1.86) if it is included together 
with Pooled Non-Common CGI, although still near zero if included together with Pooled CGI (coeff. = -
0.001).  Our results with richer covariates suggest that these results are spurious, and reflect omitted 
variable bias. 
5.4.  Robustness of Prior Multicountry Studies 
We revisit here three well-known multicountry studies, Klapper and Love (2004); Durnev and 
Kim (2005); and Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell (2008), in light of the limited power we found for the 
Common Index, and evidence of upward bias in estimates that rely on limited covariates.8  A first step is 
to assess the results we would obtain using our Common Index, with a pure cross-sectional specification 
similar to theirs.  We use 2001 for Korea (the first year when 1999 legal reforms were fully effective) and 
the first available year for other countries.  In unreported results with DK covariates and country weights, 
the coefficient on Common Index is 0.043 (t = 3.12).  However, this result weakens as we strengthen the 
covariates and move to pooled OLS and then RE, and vanishes entirely with FE.  Thus, even a t-statistic 
above 3 does not ensure that cross-sectional results with limited covariates are reliable. 
Klapper and Love (2004) report evidence that the Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) cross-
country index for 2001 predicts higher Tobin’s q and ROA, with t-values around 2.75.  Durnev and Kim 
(2005) find that the CLSA index from 2001 and the S&P Transparency and Disclosure Index from 2000 
predict higher Tobin’s q, but weakly – with p-values of 0.06 for the CLSA index and 0.04 for S&P.  
Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell (2008) study the association between board independence and market 
value, proxied by raw Tobin’s q, for firms with a controlling shareholder.  Their covariates are stronger 
than Klapper and Love or Durnev and Kim, but still limited.  They report p-values with country fixed 
effects from [.02, .10].  The statistical significance of all of these results could easily vanish with a 
stronger specification.  Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell also report that their power comes, in significant 
part from India.  In unreported regressions similar to those in Table 3 which include each subindex 
separately, we find an insignificant coefficient on India Board Structure Subindex.  This suggests that 
omitted variable bias could explain their India results. 
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6.  Sensitivity Analyses 
6.1.  Sensitivity of Results to Omitted Variables 
FE or RE with extensive covariates can reduce but not eliminate the potential for omitted variable 
bias.  To assess the sensitivity of our results to unobserved covariates, we adapt to panel data two related 
approaches, one from statistics (Hosman, Hansen, and Holland, 2010; below HHH) and one from 
economics (Altonji, Elder, and Taber, 2005; Altonji et al., 2011; Oster, 2013; below, ACET-O).  Both 
approaches use the influence of known covariates on the coefficient of interest to provide bounds on that 
coefficient, if there are similarly influential but omitted covariates.  This approach is credible only if one 
begins with a rich set of included covariates.  These bounds have not been used in prior governance 
research.  We summarize the estimation procedures here; the expanded working paper includes further 
details.9   
Consider FE (eqn. (2)) and a single omitted covariate u, and let βlong (βshort) be the coefficient on 
CGI from a “long” (“short”) regression of q on CGI which includes (excludes) u.  A standard econometric 
result for an omitted variable u is: 
,| |=| ( , ) * ( , ) |short long CGIq u CGI uβ β ρ ρ− x x    (5) 
Here ρ(a,u)b is the partial correlation between a and u, conditioned on a vector of covariates b,10 and we 
take absolute values for convenience, since the signs of the partial correlation coefficients are not known, 
and the principal concern is upward bias in β1,short.  HHH show that (5) can be rewritten as: 
,| | = | ( , ) *[s.e.( )* ] |short long CGI short uq u tβ β ρ β− x . (6) 
Here se(x) is the standard error of x.  Eqn. (6) can be generalized to allow multiple omitted variables u.  
Let 2shortR  (
2
longR ) be from a short (long) regression that omits (includes) u, let u be of rank k, let df be the 
short regression degrees of freedom, let Fu be the F-statistic for u from the long regression, define tu as 
the positive square root of Fu with a degrees of freedom correction tu = {Fu*[(k*df)/(df+1-k)]}1/2 and 
define 2 ( , )aρ bu  as the fractional decrease in unexplained variance from adding u to the regression: 
 
2 2
short long2
2
short
(1 ) (1 )
( , )
(1 )
R R
a
R
ρ − − −=
−
bu   (7) 
Then equation (6) remains valid for vector u.  They study cross-sectional OLS, but their results carry 
through to FE. 
The HHH idea is to assume that u (partially) predicts CGI as strongly (same t-statistic or, for 
multiple variables, same F-statistic) as the strongest included covariate (call this variable x1) in a 
regression of CGI on all covariates, and then to make assumptions about plausible values of ρ(q,u)x,CGI.  
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HHH suggest values from .01-.10.  An alternate approach, followed here, is to assume that ρ(q,u)x,CGI = 
largest value of ρ(q,x2)(rest of x),CGI for any included covariate x2 (which may be different than x1). 
In Table 5, row (1), we apply the HHH approach and report lower bounds βlower for the coefficient 
on governance using different assumptions about how the omitted covariates correlate with CGI and 
predict q.11  Consider first pooled CGI.  The covariate that most strongly predicts pooled CGI is state 
ownership (F for state ownership * country dummies = 15.46), but (state ownership * country dummies) 
weakly predicts Tobin’s q (ρ =.0025), so a similar omitted variable would barely affect the coefficient on 
pooled CGI (see col. (3)).  The covariate that most strongly predicts q is leverage (ρ = 0.06) but (leverage 
*country dummies) weakly predicts Pooled CGI (F = 0.87); a similar omitted variable would imply 
0.620lowerβ = , only slightly less than the regression coefficient ˆ 0.0629β =  (col. (4)).  We consider in 
column (5) a single hypothetical omitted variable which has both:  (i) the power to predict CGI of the 
variable (state ownership) which most strongly predicts CGI (F = 15.46); and (ii) the power to predict q of 
the variable (leverage) which most strongly predicts q (ρ = 0.06).  This implies ߚ௟௢௪௘௥ = 0.0579. 
A particular concern with Tobin’s q as an outcome variable in corporate governance research is 
that q is affected by growth opportunities, which are only partly observed.  We therefore consider in 
column (6) the impact of omitted variables which predict CGI and q as strongly as all covariates that 
proxy for growth opportunities or intangible assets (sales growth, net income/assets, EBIT/sales, 
advertising/sales, and R&D/sales).  This implies  ߚ௟௢௪௘௥ = 0.0613.  Finally, in column (7), if omitted 
variables predict CGI and q as strongly as all included covariates, this implies ߚ௟௢௪௘௥ = 0.0530 (t = 3.33).  
In short, the coefficient on Pooled CGI is not highly sensitive to included covariates, and thus is not likely 
to be sensitive to omitted variables.   
The ACET-O approach begins with the difference between the coefficient ߚመ௡௔௥௥௢௪ from a limited 
regression that includes only clearly exogenous covariates (in our FE model, only the year effects) 
(coefficients shown in Table 5, col., (1)) and the estimated 0629.0ˆ
1
=β .  If omitted covariates would have 
the same effect on true β and R2 as included covariates, a lower bound on the true coefficient is ߚ௟௢௪௘௥ =
ߚመ − (|ߚ෡௡௔௥௥௢௪ − ߚመ|  Table 6, column (8) summarizes the results from this approach.12  The ACET-O 
lower bound is similar in concept to the “all covariates” HHH lower bound.   
Row (2) of Table 5 is similar to row (1), but uses covariates that are not interacted with country 
dummies.  The base coefficient estimate on Pooled CGI is now 0.083.  Moreover, the lower bound 
estimates are .070 (for HHH bounds) or 0.075 (for ACET-O bounds).  These are higher than our base 
estimate with interacted covariates of 0.063.  This reinforces the point that bounds estimates are credible 
only if one begins with robust covariates. 
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The remaining rows of Table 6 report lower bounds for country CGI.  The “strongest” variable 
results in columns (2)-(4) are identical for India and Turkey because the same variable (state ownership) 
is the strongest predictor of both CGI and Tobin’s q.  Some individual country results are sensitive to 
potential omitted variables.  For example, the HHH lower bound for India CGI in column (7) is 0.050 (t = 
1.51), versus a base estimate of 0.075 (t = 2.27).  Only the Korea and Russia coefficients remain 
significant if we assume omitted covariates with the same strength as all included covariates (columns 
(7)-(8)).  And the Russia results are suspect because the available covariates are limited and t-statistics are 
only moderate (t = 2.34 for HHH bounds in column (7)).  At the same time, the lower bounds on country 
CGI are all positive and economically meaningful (ranging from .035 to .060).  Taken as a whole, the 
bounds exercise supports the power of country-specific indices to predict Tobin’s q, but also suggests the 
likely need to study a number of countries to obtain robust results. 
6.2.  Assessing Construct Validity 
In the expanded working paper, we assess how well our country CGI indices appear to capture 
the unobserved concept of corporate governance, using two approaches.  First, for each country CGI and 
subindex, we compute Cronbach α, a measure of correlation between elements of a multipart measure.  
Cronbach α measures only whether multiple elements measure a similar underlying concept, but not 
whether the underlying concept is what one has posited it to be.  In psychology, if different elements are 
designed to capture different aspects of an underlying concept, α values above 0.7 are considered strong, 
and values above 0.6 are respectable (Kline, 2000).  For country CGI, α values range from 0.64 in India to 
0.95 in Turkey.  At the subindex level, results are more mixed, ranging from 0.10 for shareholder rights in 
India to 0.98 for disclosure in Turkey.  Low values for particular country subindices suggest that these 
subindices may be poor constructs.  At the same time, 7 of the 20 subindex values are 0.6 or above, and 
13 are 0.5 or above.  
We also conduct a principal component analysis at both the subindex and element level.  At the 
subindex level, for each country, we (i) include all subindices separately in an OLS regression; (ii) retain 
factors with eigenvalue > 1.0; and (iii) apply either no rotation or a varimax rotation which produces 
orthogonal factors.  The element-level procedure is similar.  The loadings suggest that most country-level 
subindices capture coherent elements of governance. 
7.  Conclusion 
The methodological goal of this article was to address the empirical challenges involved in cross-
country assessments of what matters in corporate governance in emerging markets.  The core challenges 
are construct validity; limited data on governance, especially time-series data; and endogeneity, 
principally omitted variable bias.  We address these challenges by building country-specific indices, 
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doing so over time, and applying RE and FE methods with extensive covariates.  FE with both extensive 
covariates and country-specific response surfaces is likely to be the best available research design, but 
remains vulnerable to bias due to unobserved, time-varying covariates.  We illustrate that sensitivity with 
a bounds analysis.  An RE specification can also be useful, especially if the random effects λ is close to 1. 
Our substantive goal was to assess whether firm-level variation in corporate governance predicts 
firm-level variation in market value across a representative sample of major emerging markets.  We find 
that country-specific indices, tailored to local rules and institutions, have substantial predictive power.  It 
may also be possible to pool country-level indices, which measure similar underlying concepts in 
country-specific ways, to develop meaningful cross-country measures of governance.  In contrast, a 
“common” governance index, which relies on the same elements in each country, is hard to build, and has 
limited power to predict market value.  A caveat:  we study here whether corporate governance predicts 
firm market value, not why.  The channels through which governance affects market value are a fruitful 
area for future research. 
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Table 1. 
Elements of Board Structure and Disclosure subindices. 
Elements Brazil India Korea Turkey Common Index 
Years 2004, 06, 09 2006, 07, 12 1998-2004 2006-11  
Board Structure Subindex      
≥ 1 outside director X (NP) required required X X 
> 1 outside director avail (NP)   X  
≥ 30% outside directors X (NP) required common avail X 
≥ 50% outside directors X (NP) X X rare  
> 50% outside directors rare (NP) X X rare X 
CEO is board member common (F) common (F) common (F) X  
CEO is NOT board chairman X X avail (NP) X X 
Board has outside chair or lead director NA feas (NP) X rare  
≥ 50% outside directors or ≥ 1/3 outside directors 
& and CEO is not chairman feas (NP) X avail (NP) rare  
Firm has outside CEO NA feas feas X -- 
Audit committee X required X required X 
Audit committee has non-executive chair NA feas (NP) common (F) X  
Audit committee has outside director avail (NP) feas (NP) common (F) X  
Audit committee has majority of outside directors rare (NP) X X NA  
Compensation committee rare (NP) X X NA  
Outside director nominating committee rare (NP) NA X NA  
Corporate governance committee  rare (NP) NA rare (F) X  
Fiscal board exists X (NP) NM NM NM  
Permanent fiscal board or audit committee has 
minority shareholder representative X (NP) NM NM NM  
Disclosure Subindex      
RPTs are disclosed to shareholders X (NP) X required required X 
Firm has regular meetings with analysts X (NP) X X (NP) NA  
Firm discloses 5% holders common X required avail X 
Control group shareholder agreement disclosed  feas X NA NA  
Annual financials on firm website X X avail, NM X X 
Quarterly financial statements are consolidated X feas feas required  
Quarterly financials on firm website X X NA X  
Firm puts annual report on firm website NA X NA X  
Directors’ report on firm  website NM X NM NM  
Corp governance report on firm website NM X NM X  
Firm discloses material events on firm website NA NA NA X  
Firm discloses annual agenda of corporate events X NA required X  
Firm charter available on firm website NA NA NM X  
English language financial statements exist X NM X (NP) X X 
Financials include statement of cash flows X required required required  
Financial statements in IFRS or US GAAP X feas rare required  
MD&A discussion in financial statements X required required NA  
Shareholder voting information on firm website NA NA NA X  
Firm discloses list of insiders NA NA NA X  
Firm discloses director shareholdings NA feas (NA) required X  
Controlling shareholder disclosed    X  
Code of conduct/ethics contents disclosed    X  
Governance charter or guidelines disclosed NA avail (NP) NA X  
Annual meeting results disclosed required NA required X  
Board members' roles/employment disclosed avail NA required X  
Board members' background disclosed avail NA X X  
Board members date of joining board disclosed feas NA required X  
Background of senior managers disclosed avail NA NA X  
Information re internal audit/control disclosed NA NA required X  
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Elements Brazil India Korea Turkey Common Index 
Number of board meetings disclosed avail (NP) feas (NP) required X  
Board resolutions disclosed NA NA required X  
Executive director compensation disclosed NA NA required X  
Auditor does not provide non-audit services X (NP) X feas NA  
Non-audit fees < 25% of total auditor fees NA X feas NA  
Full board reviews auditor's recommendations NA X NA NA  
Audit partner is rotated every 5 years NM X feas NA  
Notes on cell entries:  X = element used; avail = not used, but data is available; (feas or F) = data could be collected 
with substantial effort; NA = data not available; NP = data from private survey; not publicly available; NM = not 
meaningful; required = required by law; rare = avail but rare; common = avail but nearly universal. 
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Table 2 
Definitions and summary data for principal variables.   
 Definitions Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
BCGI Brazil Corporate Governance Index 62.1 15.4 19.1 91.5 
ICGI India Corporate Governance Index 59.2 10.8 24.6 86.9 
KCGI Korea Corporate Governance Index 33.9 11.0 7.9 88.3 
RCGI Russia Corporate Governance Index (normalized) 0.00 1.00 -2.90 3.51 
TCGI Turkey Corporate Governance Index 44.7 13.1 9.3 74.7 
Pooled CGI Pooled Corporate Governance Index (normalized) 0.00 1.00 -2.98 5.21 
Common Index Index of 15 elements available in Brazil, India, Korea and Turkey (normalized) 0.00 1.00 -3.59 5.56 
Pooled Non-
common CGI 
Pooled CGI, excluding elements of Common Index 
(normalized) 0.00 1.00 -2.23 3.73 
Tobin’s q (book value of debt + market value of common stock)/ book value of assets.  1.13 1.08 0.24 32.87
ln (assets) ln(book value of assets) 10.53 5.28 3.34 25.34
ln (listed years) ln(years since public listing + 1).  India:  Use years since incorporation. 3.14 1.79 0.00 7.60 
Leverage* (Total liabilities)/assets.  India:  Use total debt. 0.49 0.22 0.00 3.33 
Net Income/assets** Ratio of net income over assets 0.03 0.10 -0.71 0.46 
EBIT/sales** Earnings before interest and tax (EBIT)/total sales 0.09 0.53 -0.58 0.72 
3-yr sales growth** Geometric average sales growth during past three years (or available period if less). 0.11 0.28 -0.73 2.30 
PPE/sales* Ratio of property, plant, and equipment (PPE) to total sales  0.52 1.06 0.00 22.88
Share turnover* (shares traded in year t)/(shares outstanding), adjusted for share issuances and splits 3.21 5.12 0.00 32.77
Inside ownership Fractional ownership of common (and equivalent) shares by largest shareholder 0.30 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Foreign ownership Fractional ownership by foreigners 0.07 0.13 0.00 0.94 
State ownership Fractional ownership by the state 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.49 
Free Float Fraction of shares floating on the stock exchange (excludes shares held by insiders) 0.61 0.22 0.02 1.00 
Capex/PPE* Ratio of capital expenditures to PPE 0.13 0.15 0.00 0.97 
R&D/sales* Ratio of R&D expenditures to total sales. 0.01 0.11 0.00 7.69 
Advertising/sales* Ratio of advertising expense to total sales.  0.02 0.71 0.00 0.10 
Exports/sales* Ratio of export revenue to total sales.  0.24 0.29 0.00 0.99 
Market share Firm’s share of sales by all public firms in same industry 0.09 0.19 0.00 1.00 
Business group 1 if firm belongs to business group in year t, 0 otherwise. 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 
MSCI  1 if firm belongs to Morgan Stanley Capital International Index (MSCI). 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
US cross listing 1 if firm is cross-listed in US (any level) in year t, 0 otherwise 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 
industry dummies defined in each country; mapped to US 2-digit SIC codes n.m. n.m.  n.m. 
Notes.  Income statement (balance sheet) amounts are measured for each year t (at end of year t).  * = winsorized at 
99% (** = also winsorized at 1%) in Table 6. 
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Table 3 
Country-level regressions with firm random effect (RE) and fixed effects (FE). 
 Dependent Variable ln(Tobin’s q; outliers excluded) 
 Country (years) Brazil (2004-2009) India (2006-2012) Korea (1998-2004) Turkey (2006-2011) Russia (1999-2005) 
 Method RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE 
normalized Country 
CGI  
0.114*** 0.089 0.064** 0.075** 0.048*** 0.045*** 0.071*** 0.055** 0.094*** 0.067*** 
(3.03) (1.15) (2.57) (2.27) (6.26) (5.33) (2.58) (2.06) (6.22) (2.75) 
(w. industry clusters) (2.69)*** (1.08) (1.85)* (1.73)* (5.80)*** (6.79)*** (2.27)** (2.01)** (4.60)*** (2.64)*** 
No. of industry clusters 38 26 32 32 48 47 36 36 49 49 
Ln (Assets) -0.039* -0.413*** 0.019 -0.411*** -0.047*** -0.053*** -0.110*** -0.258*** -0.131*** -0.226*** 
  (-1.65) (-5.23) (0.57) (-4.14) (-6.46) (-3.57) (-5.48) (-4.26) (-5.75) (-4.79) 
Years Listed -0.134*** -0.331* -3.688 31.275*** -0.076*** -0.142*** -0.057 -0.225***   
  (-3.52) (-1.98) (-1.37) (3.52) (-8.75) (-4.87) (-1.57) (-3.95)   
Leverage 0.362*** -0.054 -0.716*** 0.286 0.748*** 0.733*** 0.665*** 0.829*** 0.453*** 0.375** 
  (6.08) (-0.18) (-3.43) (0.74) (22.68) (17.61) (6.76) (5.54) (3.89) (2.30) 
Net income/assets 0.347 -0.725 1.483* 1.131 0.1410*** 0.148*** 0.481*** 0.394*** 0.787*** 0.359 
  (1.40) (-1.43) (1.96) (1.28) (3.73) (3.87) (3.47) (2.66) (2.87) (1.30) 
EBIT/sales 0.006*** 0.462 0.000 0.016 -0.007* -0.009** -0.013 -0.03   
  (3.37) (0.81) (0.55) (0.44) (-1.95) (-2.21) (1.18) (-0.36)   
Sales growth 0.033 0.201** 0.466*** 0.163 -0.0001 -0.0002*** 0.14 0.160* 0.190*** 0.248*** 
  (0.64) (2.53) (3.68) (0.75) (-1.06) (-2.60) (1.55) (1.73) (3.16) (3.76) 
PPE/sales -0.014 0.052* 0.001*** 0.000 -0.010** -0.015** 0.01 0.018*   
  (-1.35) (1.81) (5.46) (0.13) (-2.04) (-2.54) (1.40) (1.67)   
Share turnover 0.031 0.060 0.536*** 0.761*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.039** 0.038** -1.503* -1.498* 
  (0.81) (1.33) (4.28) (3.41) (6.74) (6.66) (2.20) (2.41) (-1.95) (-1.67) 
Inside ownership 0.005 0.165 0.615*** 0.929 -0.183*** -0.175*** 0.097 0.268   
  (0.06) (0.80) (3.07) (1.63) (-3.84) (-2.66) (0.73) (1.12)   
Foreign ownership 1.501*** 2.491*** 0.469*** 0.456*** -0.27 -0.367*   
  (4.64) (3.71) (7.69) (6.63) (-1.34) (1.66)   
State ownership -0.079 -2.664*** -0.690 -37.457*** 0.142 0.209* 0.370** 0.645***   
  (-0.25) (-4.69) (-0.76) (-5.00) (1.55) (1.94) (2.08) (6.13)   
Free Float     -0.139*** -0.175*** -0.234** -0.07   
  (-3.30) (-3.32) (-2.46) (-0.63)   
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 Dependent Variable ln(Tobin’s q; outliers excluded) 
 Country (years) Brazil (2004-2009) India (2006-2012) Korea (1998-2004) Turkey (2006-2011) Russia (1999-2005) 
 Method RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE 
Capex/PPE -0.000 -0.000 0.095*** 0.071*** 0.008*** 0.006**   
  (-1.13) (-0.84) (4.01) (3.13) (4.49) (2.09)   
R&D/sales 5.054** -3.880 0.030*** 0.024*** -4.006*** -3.350**   
  (2.29) (-0.57) (5.80) (3.15) (2.74) (2.00)   
Advertising/sales -0.014 -0.930 0.994** 0.986*    
  (-0.45) (-0.44) (2.19) (1.70)    
Exports/sales -0.136 0.053 -0.046** -0.056* 0.032 0.018   
  (-1.25) (0.17) (-2.13) (-1.90) (0.27) (0.13)   
Market Share 0.169*** 0.173** 0.071 0.283   
  (2.60) (2.37) (0.49) (0.61)   
Business group dummy -0.163** 0.026 0.043*** 0.054    
  (-1.97) (0.385) (2.62) (0.92)    
Cross-listing dummy 0.207** 0.260** -0.094 0.043 0.016 0.001   
  (2.55) (2.41) (-1.080) (1.07) (0.39) (-0.03)   
MSCI 0.208 0.0381** 0.107 -0.046 0.375***  
   (1.456)  (2.18)  (1.60) (-0.89) (5.20)  
Russia RTS stock index         0.343*** 0.362*** 
        (5.72) (5.90) 
constant, year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 236 146 636 423 3,285 3,285 969 969 964 964 
Number of firms 159 72 399 186 669 0.383 193 193 240 240 
Breusch-Pagan (χ2; p) 27.84 (0.0000) 32.78 (0.0000) 1065.68 (0.0000 328.89 (0.0000) 917.79 (0.0000) 
Hausman test (χ2; p) 31.63 (0.0045) n.a. 133.34  (0.0000) 91.44 (0.0000) n.a. 
CRE (F for all vars., p) 27.62 (0.0102) 77.79 (0.0000) 125.62 (0.0000) 74.41 (0.0000) 164.95 (0.0000) 
CRE (t for CGI alone) 0.60 -1.28 1.47 0.74 2.44** 
Median RE λ 0.33 0.30 0.63 0.66  0.71  
R2 0.40 0.50 0.33 0.34 0.53 0.38 0.48 0.52 0.63 0.46 
Notes.  t-statistics with firm clusters (firm-index clusters in Russia)) in parentheses.  R2 is overall for RE; within for FE.  *, **, and *** respectively indicate 
significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  Significant results (at 5% level or better) are in boldface.   
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Table 4 
Pooled multicountry RE and FE regressions. 
 
 Dependent variable ln(Tobin’s q), outliers excluded for each country-year 
  Separate Included together Included together 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Models Covariates Pooled CGI Common Index Common Index Pooled Non-common CGI Common Index
Pooled 
CGI 
(1) RE (unweighted)
common covariates * 
country dummies; year * 
country dummies 
Coefficient 0.067*** 0.015** 0.002 0.092*** -0.014* 0.069*** 
(7.30) (2.04) (0.22) (6.88) (-1.78) (7.01) 
(w ind’y*country clusters) (5.67) (1.70)* (0.18) (7.79) (1.74) (6.63) 
Breusch-Pagan (χ2) 897.1 1068.4 1055.3 1074.2 
CRE (F for all vars.) 251.6 163.5 141.3 206.6 
CRE (t for CGI alone) 0.15 0.40 0.76 0.43 
Median RE λ 0.715 0.721 0.722 0.723 
Overall R2 0.46 0.48 0.48 0.48 
(2) FE (weighted) same as (1) 
Coefficient 0.063*** 0.008 -0.001 0.081*** -0.012 0.057*** 
(3.95) (0.55) (-0.04) (2.84) (-0.84) (3.38) 
(w ind’y*country clusters) (3.17) (0.46) (-0.06) (2.84) (0.93) (3.34) 
Within R2 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.42 
 Results with weaker covariates        
(3) FE (weighted) 
common covariates; year 
(not interacted w. 
country dummies 
Coefficient 0.084*** 0.004 -0.010 0.120*** -0.023 0.076*** 
(4.78) (0.26) (0.73) (3.39) (1.62) (3.91) 
Within R2 0.32 0.30 0.32 0.33 
Notes.  Indices are defined in text.  Coefficients on covariates are suppressed.  FE regressions use country weights = (1/no. of firms).  All Breusch-Pagan and correlated random 
effects (CRE) p-values are 0.0000.  t-statistics with firm or, where indicated (industry*country) clusters are in parentheses.  No. of industry clusters = 154 for RE, 141 for FE, *, 
**, and *** respectively indicate significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  Significant results (at 5% level or better) are in boldface. 
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Table 5. 
Hosman, Hansen and Holland (2010) (HHH) and Altonji, Conley, Elder, Taber–Oster (ACET-O) lower bounds on FE estimates. 
 
Rows GovernanceIndex Covariates 
Narrow Base HHH Bounds Omitted variable based on 
ACET – O Bounds 
 
(1) 
 
(2) (3) 
one covariate 
(strongly 
predicts q) 
(4) 
one covariate 
(strongly 
predicts CGI)
(5) 
two covariates 
(strongly 
predict both)
(6) 
all growth and 
intangibles 
covariates 
(7) 
all covariates
(8) 
 
βnarrow ߚመ βlower ߚ௟௢௪௘௥ − |ߚ௡௔௥௥௢௪ − ߚመ|	 
(1) Pooled CGI common* country 0.0707*** 0.0629*** 0.0624*** 0.0620*** 0.0579*** 0.0613*** 0.0530*** 0.0552*** 
(4.28) (3.95) (3.92) (3.89) (3.64) (3.85) (3.33) (3.46) 
(2) Pooled CGI common 0.0906*** 0.0826*** 0.0825*** 0.0813*** 0.0811*** 0.0820*** 0.0703*** 0.0746*** 
(5.26) (4.84) (4.84) (4.77) (4.75) (4.81) (4.12) (4.37) 
(3) Brazil CGI country 0.1361** 0.0887 0.0870 0.0794 0.0612 0.0778 0.0595 0.0419 
(2.14) (1.15) (1.12) (1.02) (0.79) (1.00) (0.77) (0.54) 
(4) India CGI country 0.0893*** 0.0750** 0.0743*** 0.0743*** 0.0743*** 0.0743*** 0.0501 0.0607* 
(2.89) (2.27) (2.25) (2.25) (2.25) (2.25) (1.51) (1.84) 
(5) Korea CGI country 0.0449*** 0.0448*** 0.0439*** 0.0423*** 0.0369*** 0.0447*** 0.0372*** 0.0399*** 
(4.93) (5.33) (5.19) (5.00) (4.37) (5.30) (4.40) (4.73) 
(6) Turkey CGI country 0.0841*** 0.0550** 0.0536** 0.0536** 0.0536** 0.0533** 0.0347 0.0259 
(2.67) (2.06) (2.01) (2.01) (2.01) (1.99) (1.30) (0.97) 
(7) Russia CGI country 0.0645** 0.0670*** 0.0669*** 0.0658*** 0.0595*** 0.0645*** 0.0570*** 0.0645**
(2.48) (2.75) (2.74) (2.70) (2.44) (2.64) (2.34) (2.65) 
 
Notes.  Column (1) shows coefficients for pooled CGI and country CGIs from “narrow” FE regressions, for which the only covariates are year dummies.  Column (2) adds 
covariates.  Columns (3)-(7) show HHH lower bounds on coefficient estimate under different assumptions about omitted covariates.  Column (8) shows ACET-O lower bound.  t-
statistics (using standard errors from regressions in column (2) are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** respectively indicate significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  Significant 
results (at 5% level or better) are in boldface. 
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1  Studies using this approach include Durnev and Kim (2005); Klapper and Love (2004); Dahya, Dimitrov, and 
McConnell (2008) (board independence); Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2007). 
2  BRIKT is a play on the World Bank’s use of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) as key emerging markets.  
See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BRIC.  Some would add Turkey.  We study Korea instead of China because the 
dominance of state-controlled firms in China means that generalizability is suspect.  We also put aside studies of 
firm-level governance in developed markets, which raise different governance concerns (Bebchuk and Hamdani, 
2009), and have less severe data constraints.  We also do not address here the effects of country-level 
governance – the “LLSV and all that” line of research on how country level governance affects capital markets 
and economic performance.  See, e.g., La Porta et al. (1997, 1998). 
3  This research complements our studies of individual countries.  See, e.g., Black, de Carvalho and Gorga 
(2012); de Carvalho and Pennacchi (2012) (Brazil); Balasubramanian, Black and Khanna (2010); Black and 
Khanna (2007); (India); Black, Jang and Kim (2006a); Black and Kim (2012); (Korea); Black, Love and 
Rachinsky (2006) (Russia); Ararat, Black and Yurtoglu (2013) (Turkey). 
4  Our Korea, Russia, and Turkey datasets and replication statistical code will be posted on the Social Science 
Research Network www.ssrn.com, and linked to the expanded working paper version of this article.  The Brazil, 
India, and pooled datasets are subject to confidentiality restrictions, and are available from the authors for 
projects that do not overlap with our own work in progress, who agree to maintain the needed confidentiality. 
5  See Black, Jang and Kim (2006b, Korea), Balasubramian, Black and Khanna (2010, India); Ararat, Black, and 
Yurtoglu (2014, Turkey)). 
6  We benefit from a shock to board structure in Korea during our sample period (see Black and Kim, 2012), but 
have no comparable shocks in other countries.  Some studies address endogeneity by instrumenting for 
governance, Tobin’s q, or both.  We find the instruments unconvincing, and do not pursue this approach here 
(see Larcker and Rusticus, 2010; Roberts and Whited, 2012). 
7  The CRE model adds time-demeaned variables  and CGIx  to the random effects model in eqn. (3).  The 
coefficient and standard error onCGI  provides a test of whether RE and FE coefficients on CGI are different; 
an F-test for all coefficients measures whether RE and FE as a whole produce different results.  The advantages 
over the Hausman test are: (i) one can use clustered standard errors; (ii) one can test for different FE and RE 
coefficients both for CGI alone and for all coefficients together; (iii) in practice, the Hausman test often fails to 
run (for us, it fails in India and Russia).   
8  Our goal is to assess the robustness of results, not to criticize these articles.  Klapper and Love (2004) and 
Durnev and Kim (2005) are also concerned as much with what predicts governance as with whether governance 
predicts firm market value. 
9  Stata code is available from the authors on request. 
10  More formally:  Regress a on c and constant term, determine the residual a , and similarly for b, then 
compute ( , )Corr a b .  See, e.g., Angrist and Pischke (2009), § 3.2.2. 
11  We use winsorized covariates.  If we do not winsorize, then some covariates correlate strongly with pooled 
CGI.  Winsorizing covariates has little effect on the coefficients on our country or Pooled CGI indices. 
12  ACET-O assume that covariates will reduce β1, and thus use ߚଵ − ߚ௡௔௥௥௢௪ instead of  |ߚ෡ଵ − ߚ௡௔௥௥௢௪|. 
